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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
GRAYCE HURD, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of Lloyd I. Hurd, Deceased
and GRAYCE HURD, Personally,

]
]
]

Plaintiffs/Appellees,

]

vs.

]

LEWELLYN J. SHERMAN and
CONNIE SHERMAN,

] Court of Appeals No. 970202CA
Civil No: 940600001
]

Defendants/Appellants.

]

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANTS
I.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1996) and §78-2a-3(2)(j), and pursuant to
Utah R. App. P. 3.
II.
A.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether plaintiff, Grayce Hurd, as personal

representative of the Estate of Lloyd Hurd, can bring and
maintain an action against the defendants, and whether the Estate
of Lloyd Hurd itself can bring and maintain an action against the
defendants.

1.

Standard of Review

Correction of error standard.

See Bailey v. Call. 767 P.2d

138 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied. 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).
B.

Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that a

constructive trust had been created for the benefit of the
plaintiff.

See Addendum B, Conclusion of Law at f 1.
1.

Standard of Review

"Conclusions of law [are] accord[ed] no particular
deference, but [are] review[ed] for correctness."

Scharf v. BMG

Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985) (citing Automotive
Manufacturers Warehouse, Inc. v. Service Auto Parts, Inc., 596
P.2d 1033, 1036 (Utah 1979) and Betenseon v. Call Auto &
Equipment Sales, Inc., 645 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 1982)).
C.

Whether the trial court erred when it found there was

no consideration for the quitclaim deed, the checks and the
vehicle titles.

See Addendum B, Amended Findings of Fact at 5

25.
1.

Standard of Review

The standard of review is whether the finding is clearly
erroneous.
D.

Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 1987).
Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that

that all of the property should be immediately returned to the
plaintiff.
00004646.97
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1.

standard of Review

"Conclusions of law [are] accord[ed] no particular
deference, but [are] review[ed] for correctness."

Scharf v. BMG

Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985) (citing Automotive
Manufacturers Warehouse, Inc. v. Service Auto Parts, Inc.. 596
P.2d 1033, 1036 (Utah 1979) and Betenseon v. Call Auto &
Equipment Sales, Inc., 645 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 1982)).
E.

Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient

to prove the plaintiffs' claims?
1.

Standard of Review

Correction of error standard.

See Bailey v. Call. 767 P.2d

138 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

There are no constitutional provisions at issue in this
case.
IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final Judgment and Order of the

Sixth Judicial District Court, Kane County, Kanab Department,
State of Utah, the Honorable David L. Mower, presiding wherein
after a trial date on April 4, 1996, the Court ordered that the
constructive trust created by the parties was terminated, and
that the items transferred to the defendants, either of them, as
00004646.97
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constructive trustees, shall be delivered to the plaintiff within
a ten (10) day period from the date of the Court's Order.

In

addition to the items to be transferred from the defendants to
the plaintiff, see Addendum A (subparagraphs a-e), the trial
court granted judgment against the defendants in the sum of
$20,000.00 and costs.
B.

Id.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The present appeal arises out of the conveyance of real

property, the transfer of funds from a checking account, and the
transfer of personal property.

The plaintiffs are, Grayce Hurd

("Grayce"), as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Lloyd
I. Hurd ("Mr. Hurd") and Grayce, Hurd, personally, See Addendum B
at 5 1.

The defendants are Lewellyn Sherman ("Mr. Sherman") and

Connie Sherman ("Ms. Sherman").

Id. at f 1.

Mr. Hurd and Grayce lived together since approximately 1964,
however, they never entered into a formal marriage contract.
at f 6.

R-256, 377, 386, 392, 226, 236.

during the course of their relationship.

Id.

No children were born
Id.

At no time prior

to the death or since the death of Mr. Hurd has there been any
judicial proceeding or administrative proceeding wherein Grayce
was declared to be the common-law wife of Mr. Hurd.

R-157, 399.

Mr. Hurd died on June 3, 1992, see Addendum B at fl 5 and,
accordingly, the relationship between Mr. Hurd and Grayce ended.
00004646.97
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Prior to Mr. Hurd's death, he met with attorney Keith
Eddington ("Mr. Eddington").

R-357.

This meeting occurred at

the residence of Mr. Sherman, and was in response to a request
that Mr. Eddington prepare, review, and advise Mr. Hurd on a
Power of Attorney document.

R-361, 363, 365.

During the meeting between Mr. Hurd and Mr. Eddington, Mr.
Hurd was advised by Mr. Eddington of what rights he would be
relinquishing by executing the Power of Attorney.

R-359, 361.

Essentially, Mr. Hurd was informed by Mr. Eddington that if he
executed the Power of Attorney, designating Mr. Sherman as the
attorney-in-fact, he would be permitting Mr. Sherman to act as
though he was Mr. Hurd.

R-359, 361.

Due to the legal significance of a Power of Attorney, Mr.
Eddington's concern was whether Mr. Hurd understood what was
happening, whether or not that was his wish, and whether the
execution of the Power of Attorney was being forced upon him.
357.

R-

Mr. Eddington's conclusion was that the Power of Attorney

was not being forced upon Mr. Hurd, and that he understood what
was going on.

R-357, 361. In fact, Mr. Eddington testified that

Mr. Hurd made it clear that it was his wish to execute the Power
of Attorney; there was no hesitation on Mr. Hurd's part when he
executed the Power of Attorney.

R-361. With respect to the

Power of Attorney, it was Mr. Hurd's desire to execute it in
00004646.97

5

favor of Mr. Sherman because he trusted him.

R-359.

Part of the

considerations for executing the Power of Attorney in favor of
Mr. Sherman was because Mr. Hurd wanted to see that Grayce was
taken care of.

R-365. (Power of Attorney is found at plaintiffs7

Exhibit no. 2 3.)
During the course of their meeting, Mr. Hurd and Mr.
Eddington also discussed gift taxes and the ability to transfer
$10,000.00 tax free. R-360. Mr. Hurd also inquired about what

potential

problems

might arise

property to Mr. Sherman.

if he transferred

all

of

his

R-360. Mr. Eddington informed him that

he did not know the value of his estate, however, if it was over
$10,000.00, he could have a gift tax problem.

Id.

Mr. Eddington

further informed Mr. Hurd that if he wanted to disperse it
between the children of Grayce, he could most likely get away
with that.

Id.

Mr. Hurd responded by informing Mr. Eddington

that he did not trust the other children, but he did trust Mr.
Sherman with Grayce.

Id.

Regarding the transfer of property, Mr. Hurd did not inform
Mr. Eddington that he had a conversation with either Mr. Sherman
or Ms. Sherman.

R-361. With respect to being advised on money

matters, neither defendant ever advised Mr. Hurd about these
matters.

R-389, 402, 407, 409. Mr. Sherman also neither induced

Mr. Hurd to transfer the home into his name nor to execute the
00004646.97
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Power of Attorney in his name. R-411, 415. Mr. Hurd had
informed Lorna Guenther, his cousin (R-222), while at the V. A.
Hospital (R-223) prior to his staying at the defendants' home and
prior to meeting Mr. Eddington, that he was going to give Mr.
Sherman Power of Attorney and to have his home and all property
transferred to and to belong to Mr. Sherman. R-226-228, 230-231.
These same statements were made to Kenneth and Deon Lamb at a
different time at the V. A. Hospital prior to Mr. Hurd staying at
the defendants' home that he, Mr. Hurd, was going to give his
property and home to Mr. Sherman and give Mr. Sherman Power of
Attorney over all his property. R-373, 375, 381-382. Kenneth
Lamb was Mr. Hurd's cousin. R-368.
With respect to Mr. Hurd's bank account at Zions Bank, Mr.
Sherman was instructed by Mr. Hurd to withdraw the money and to
transfer the money into an account in his name.
(Note:

R-412, 413.

The account was sole owned and held by Mr. Hurd.)

An

additional discussion occurred regarding the transfer of the
funds, which was that the transfer of funds were to be as gifts.
R-412, 413.

First, there was to be a $10,000.00 gift for Mr.

Sherman and, second, there was to be a $10,000.00 gift for Ms.
Sherman.

An additional instruction from Mr. Hurd to Mr. Sherman

was that he was to transfer the home into his name.

R-415. Mr.

Hurd attempted to explain the gift transfer of the bank monies
00004646.97
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but Grayce states she didn't understand what Mr. Hurd meant.

R-

400-401.
To effectuate the conveyance of the real property, Grayce
and Mr. Sherman signed a quitclaim deed, which said deed was
recorded on June 2, 1992.

See Addendum B 1 22. See also

plaintiffs7 Exhibit no. 21. The grantors were Mr. Hurd and
Grayce Hurd, husband and wife, and the grantees were Mr. Sherman
and Ms. Sherman, as joint tenants with full rights of
survivorship, and not as tenants in common.

Mr. Sherman signed

the quitclaim deed as the attorney-in-fact.

Grayce signed the

quitclaim deed after she and Mr. Hurd discussed signing the
quitclaim deed, and then she signed because they (Grayce and Mr.
Hurd) mutually agreed she sign.

R-318, 321.

In fact, all of the

personal property (truck, trailer, etc.) which was signed over to
Mr. Sherman by Grayce was done after she and Mr. Hurd talked
about it, then mutually agreed to sign it over.

R-318-321.

The

record is devoid of any evidence of any discussions or requests
from either defendant to Grayce to transfer property held in her
name to either defendant.
Regarding the trial court's Findings of Fact, the Court
found that Mr. Hurd and Grayce lived in several different cities,
and acquired both real and personal property over the years.

See

Addendum B f 7(a). That the two had filed tax returns with the
00004646.97
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IRS and the State of Utah for the calendar year of 1986, which
said filing status indicated that they were filing as married,
and filing jointly.

Id. at fl 7(b). That on June 10, 1985, they

received a warranty deed from Georgia Phelps in which the
grantees were Mr. Hurd and Grayce, his wife.

Id. at 5 7(c).

That on that same date, they purchased title insurance in the
names of Mr. Hurd and Grayce Hurd, his wife.

Id. at f 7(d).

That in June and July of 1986, they maintained a joint checking
account with Zions First National Bank, Kanab Office.
7(d).

Id. at 5

From 1984 to 1986, they maintained a joint checking

account with Valley Bank and Trust, Granger-Hunter Office; the
account was in the names of Mr. Lloyd Hurd and Mrs. Lloyd Hurd.
Id. at f 7(e) .
The trial court found on June 1, 1992, Mr. Hurd and Grayce
owned the following items of property:
a.

A house and lot located in Kanab, Kane County, State of

Utah, more particularly described as:
Beginning at a point 6.0 rods East of the Southwest
corner of Lot 2, Block 26, Plat "A" of the official
survey of Kanab Townsite, and running thence East 6.0
rods, then north 108.75°; thence West 6.0 rods; thence
South 108.75° to the point of beginning;
b.

Two shares of stock in the Kanab irrigation Company;

c.

A travel trailer, fifth-wheel type, Teton brand, 1978

model;
00004646.97
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d.

A travel trailer, 18 feet long, Kit Companion brand;

e.

A 1911 Chevrolet pickup truck;

f.

A 1980 Oldsmobile automobile;

g.

A bank account at Zions First National Bank, Kanab

Branch, account no: 052-50552-6, worth $20,420.85; and
h.

A bank account at Zions First National Bank, Kanab

Branch, account no: 052-33638-5, worth $789.65.

Id. at f 9(a).

The trial court also found that on Friday, May 29, 1992, a
conversation took place at Mr. Sherman's house between Mr. Hurd,
Grayce, Mr. Sherman and Ms. Sherman.

For the sake of brevity,

the defendants incorporate those findings, see id. at J 16,
without setting them out.

With respect to the trial court's

findings regarding the conversation, it should be noted that the
trial court's findings are speculative, that is, the Court found
that "[t]he conversation probably went something like this[.] n
Id.
The trial court further found that neither Mr. Sherman nor
Ms. Sherman paid money or transferred anything of value to Grayce
in exchange for the quitclaim deed, the checks, and the vehicle
titles.

Id. at \ 25.

Finally, the trial court found that one year had passed
since Mr. Hurd's death, and no claims had been made by Social

00004646.97
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Security, the Veteran's Administration, Medicare, or any longterm care provider.

Id. at ff 33-34.

Based on the trial court's Findings of Fact, it made three
Conclusions of Law.

First, that a constructive trust had been

created for the benefit of Grayce.

Id. at f 1.

The second

Conclusion of Law was that all of the property received in trust
for the benefit of Grayce should be immediately returned,
assigned and transferred to Grayce, including the following:
a.

A house and lot located in Kanab, Kane County, State of

Utah, or particularly described as:
Beginning at a point 6.0 rods East of the Southwest
corner of Lot 2, Block 26, Plat "A" of the official
survey of Kanab Townsite, and running thence East 6.0
rods, then north 108.75°; thence West 6.0 rods; thence
South 108.75° to the point of beginning;
b.

Two shares of stock in the Kanab irrigation Company;

c.

A travel trailer, 5th-wheel type, Teton brand, 1978

model;
d.

A travel trailer, 18 feet long, Kit Companion brand;

e.

A 1977 Chevrolet pickup truck;

f.

A 1980 Oldsmobile automobile;

g.

$20,000.00 taken by defendants from Zions First

National Bank, account no: 052-50552-6.

Id. at f 2.

The final Conclusion of Law by the trial court was that
Grayce was entitled to a judgment against Mr. Sherman and Ms.
00004646.97
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Sherman in the sum of $20,000.00, together with court costs
incurred.

Id. at J 3.
V.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

The defendants argue that the plaintiff is not a real party
in interest, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Lloyd H.
Hurd, based upon her claim of being the surviving spouse of Mr.
Hurd because Grayce did not, within one year, obtain either a
judicial or administrative order establishing that she was the
common-law wife of Mr. Hurd.

Because she did not establish that

she was the common-law wife of Mr. Hurd, she is not the real
party in interest as the Personal Representative of the Estate of
Lloyd H. Hurd and, accordingly, she cannot bring and maintain a
cause of action against the defendants in that capacity.

The

defendants also argue that there is no person who can bring and
maintain a cause of action on behalf of the Estate because no
person satisfies the enumerated factors set forth in Utah Code
Ann. § 75-3-203(1)(a-f) (1987).
Additionally, the defendants assert the trial court erred
when it imposed a constructive trust on the conveyed real
property, transferred funds, and transferred personal property.
This is because the trial did not find, by clear and convincing
evidence, that "certain circumstances" existed before it imposed
the constructive trust.

00004646.97
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have found are twofold.

First, it should have the existence of a

confidential relationship and, second, the existence of an oral
promise to hold property.
The defendants also argue that the trial court erred when it
determined there was no consideration for the quitclaim deed, the
checks and the vehicle titles. This is because in one instance,
consideration is unnecessary.

In the second instance, it also

was unnecessary because the transfers were gifts.
instance,

there

was sufficient

In the third

consideration.

The defendants further argue that the trial court erred when
it concluded that all of the previously transferred property be
immediately returned because the property was transferred to
create a life estate, and because any reconveyance of property
places Grayce and Mr. Sherman in their respective positions, that
is, tenants in common.
Finally, the defendants assert that the evidence does not
establish plaintiffs' claim.
action, fraud.

Plaintiffs alleged one cause of

As previously stated, the evidence does not

establish the existence of a confidential relationship.

Without

the evidence demonstrating the existence of a confidential
relationship, that claim must fail.

Additionally, regarding

plaintiffs7 claim sounding in fraud, the plaintiffs failed to
plead then prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the essential
00004646.97
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elements for a claim sounding in fraud and, therefore, all claims
of plaintiffs fail.
VI.
A.

ARGUMENTS

THE PLAINTIFF, GRAYCE HURD, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE ESTATE OF MR. HURD, CANNOT BRING AND MAINTAIN AN ACTION
AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS NOR CAN ANY PERSON BRING AND MAINTAIN
AN ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE
Mr. Hurd and Grayce lived together since approximately 19 64,

however, they never entered into a formal marriage contract•
Addendum B at f 6.

See

Based on that relationship, plaintiff Grayce

Hurd asserted herself as the real party in interest as the
Personal Representative of the Estate of Lloyd H. Hurd because
she was the "surviving spouse" of Mr. Hurd.

R-155, 157.

See

Utah Code Ann. 75-3-203(1)(d) (Supp. 1993).

Grayce's assertion

as the real party interest, as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Lloyd H. Hurd, must fail.
Utah R. Civ. P. 17(a) states, in pertinent part, that
"[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest."

"Under the rule, the real party in interest is the

person entitled to enforce the right asserted under the governing
substantive law."

Certain Interested Underwriters v. Layne, 26

F.3d 39, 42-43 (6th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).

The

defendants assert that Grayce is not entitled to enforce any
right of the Estate of Lloyd H. Hurd, as Personal Representative

00004646.97
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of that Estate, on the ground that she is not the surviving
spouse of Mr. Hurd.
In order for Grayce to establish the existence of a commonlaw marriage between herself and Mr. Hurd and, thus, be the
surviving spouse of Mr. Hurd, Grayce must have obtained either a
court or administrative order declaring she was the common-law
wife of Mr. Hurd.

See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(1) (1987).

This

order must have established that the common-law marriage arose
out of a contract between two consenting parties, that is, Mr.
Hurd and Grayce, and the order must have also established the
enumerated factors set forth in § 30-1-4.5(a-e).

And, n[t]he

determination or establishment of a marriage . . . must [have]
occur[ed] . . . within one year following the termination of that
relationship."

§ 30-1-4.5(2).

See also Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d

791, 793 (Utah 1994) ("Subsection (2) states that the court or
administrative order must be entered 'within one year following
the termination of that relationship.7").

Also Buach v.

Enqlehom. 906 P.2d 918 (Utah.App. 1995).
Mr. Hurd died on June 3, 1992, (see Addendum B at fl 5 ) , and,
accordingly, the relationship between Mr. Hurd and Grayce ended.
Pursuant to § 30-1-4.5(2), Grayce had until June 3, 1993 to
establish the existence of a common-law marriage between herself
and Mr. Hurd.
00004646.97
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Because Grayce

did not establish, within one year, that she was the common-law
wife of Mr. Hurd, she cannot now act as a real party in interest,
as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Lloyd H. Hurd,
based upon her assertion that she is the surviving spouse of Mr.
Hurd under § 75-3-203(1)(d).

Therefore, Grayce, acting in the

capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Lloyd H.
Hurd, cannot bring and maintain an action against the defendants.
Because Grayce is not the surviving spouse of Mr. Hurd, and
cannot act as a Personal Representative of the Estate of Lloyd
Hurd based upon her surviving spouse claim, and there having been
no person duly appointed as a Personal Representative of the
Estate of Lloyd H. Hurd who meets one of the requirements set
forth in § 75-3-203(1)(a-f), there is no person who is a real
party in interest who can bring and maintain an action on behalf
of the Estate of Lloyd H. Hurd against the defendants.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT A CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUST HAD BEEN CREATED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PLAINTIFF
"A constructive trust is an equitable remedy to prevent

unjust enrichment in the absence of any express or implied
intention to form a trust."

Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1117,

1179 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Matter of Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d
1111 (Utah 1982)).

And, "under certain circumstances that equity

will impress a constructive trust upon property."
Rasmussen, 558 P.2d 511, 513 (Utah 1976).
00004646.97
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Nielson v.

These certain

circumstances must be found to exist "by clear and convincing
evidence."

Id. (citing Jewell v. Horner. 366 P.2d 594 (Utah

1961) and Chambers v. Emery, 45 P. 192 (Utah 1896)).

However,

before a constructive trust will be impressed upon property,
there must be a finding of the existence of a confidential
relationship,

see id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts §

Sec. 45(b) (1959)).

See also Ashton, 733 P.2d at 151 ("The

transferee at the time of the transfer was in a confidential
relationship to the transferor.") (quoting Restatement (Second)
of Trusts § 45(b) (1957)).
In order to find the existence of a confidential
relationship, it is insufficient to find a "relationship based
upon sincere affection, confidence, and trust . . . [because]
such characteristics alone do not establish a confidential
relationship in it legal sense." Mattes, 759 P.2d at 1179
(citing Blodaett v. Martsch. 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978) and
Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 401 P.2d 710 (Utah 1965)) (ellipsis
inserted) (bracket inserted).

Instead, lf[t]he doctrine of

confidential relationship rests upon the principle of inequality
between the parties, and implies a position of superiority
occupied by one of the parties over the other[.]"

id (citing

Webster v. Lehmerf 742 P.2d 1203, 1206 (Utah 1987) (quoting
Bradbury, 401 P.2d at 713)) (other citations omitted).
00004646.97
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The defendants herein assert that before the trial court
could impose a constructive trust on the conveyed real property,
the transfer of funds as gifts, and the transfer of personal
property, it should have found, first, that a confidential
relationship existed between Mr. Sherman and Mr. Lloyd and,
second, it should have found there was an oral promise by Mr.
Sherman to Mr. Hurd to hold property.
These "certain circumstances" must exist as to Mr. Hurd and
Mr. Sherman because Mr. Hurd executed a Power of Attorney
designating Mr. Sherman as the attorney-in-fact,(R-359) and it
was through this status Mr. Sherman signed the quitclaim deed as
Mr. Hurd, which conveyed the real property, see Addendum B at J
22; and it was through this status that Mr. Sherman transferred
the funds from Mr. Hurd/s personal account as gifts to himself
and Ms. Sherman. R-413.

As to the transfer of vehicle titles,

there must also be a showing of a confidential relationship
between Mr. Hurd and Mr. Sherman because Mr. Hurd and Grayce had
discussions concerning the transfer of those titles and,
therefore, there should have been a finding that Mr. Sherman
occupied a position of superiority over Mr. Hurd which caused Mr.
Hurd to discuss the transfer of the vehicle titles with Grayce
whereby Mr. Hurd could convince Grayce to transfer those titles.

00004646.97
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With respect to the existence of a confidential relationship
between Mr. Hurd and Mr. Sherman, the trial court made no such
finding.

See Addendum B.

Moreover, the record is devoid of

evidence of a clear and convincing nature which would establish
the existence of a confidential relationship between Mr. Hurd and
Mr. Sherman.
For instance, during direct examination, Mr. Kenneth Lamb
when asked if there were any directives given by Mr. Sherman to
transfer the property testified as follows: "No. Lloyd done that
his self.

Lloyd wanted that, that's the way Lloyd wanted it. He

was his own mind until he died."

R-375:10-11.

Similarly, Mrs.

Lamb testified that Mr. Hurd had his own mind, his own thoughts.
Id. at 381.

She also testified that he was not easily induced

into doing things by others, and that he was kind of stubborn.
Id.

It is apparent from the Lambs testimony that Mr. Hurd was a

head-strong, independent and stubborn individual.

According to

the Lambs testimony, it is very unlikely that Mr. Sherman
occupied a position of dominance over Mr. Hurd.
Additionally, Mr. Eddington's conclusion was that the Power
of Attorney was not being forced upon Mr. Hurd, Id at 359:13,
but, rather, it was Mr. Hurd's desire to execute the Power of
Attorney.

Id. at 361:25. This was evident because there was no

hesitation on Mr. Hurd's part when he signed the Power of
00004646.97
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Attorney.

Id. at line 24. Therefore, according to Mr.

Eddington's testimony, Mr. Sherman could not have occupied a
position of dominance over Mr. Hurd because it was Mr. Hurd's
desire to sign the Power of Attorney.
Finally, plaintiffs' own testimony refutes any claim of a
confidential relationship between Mr. Hurd and Mr. Sherman.

This

is because Grayce and Mr. Hurd discussed signing the quitclaim
deed, and then they both came to a mutual agreement regarding the
signing of the quitclaim deed based upon their discussions.
at 318.

Id.

In fact, with respect to the transfer of personal

property, Grayce and Mr. Hurd discussed the transfers, and then
both mutually agreed on the transfers based upon their
discussions.

Id. at 318-319. Accordingly, plaintiffs' own

testimony clearly shows no position of superiority by Mr. Sherman
over Mr. Hurd because the decisions to transfer both real
property and personal property were mutual agreements between
Grayce and Mr. Hurd based upon those discussions.
Regarding the transfer of property, the evidence
demonstrates that Mr. Hurd transferred his interest to Mr.
Sherman because "that is the way [he] wanted it.11

Id at 375. He

also transferred his interest after discussing it with Grayce.
Grayce voluntarily transferred her interest after she discussed
the transfer with Mr. Hurd.
00004646.97
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Security Bank, 723 P.2d 398, 401 (Utah 1986), [this Court] held,
"Absent fraud, duress, mistake, or the like attributable to the
grantee, a competent grantor will not be permitted to attack or
impeach his own deed."'"

Mattes, 759 p.2d at 1179.

Because the

transfer was voluntarily made by the plaintiffs, and because
plaintiffs cannot show the existence of fraud, see infra,
subsection D, the plaintiff cannot attack or impeach her own
deed.

Regarding

an oral promise to hold property,

the trial

court

did find there might have been such a conversation between Mr.
Sherman to Mr. Hurd.

The trial court found that the following

conversation "probably" occurred.

From Mr Sherman: "Let's do

this: I'll keep all of the property for a year.
for social security.

Mom can apply

If nobody says anything for a year, then we

shoulcj be safe and I'll give all of th$ property back to her.
the meantime, she can continue living in the house.

See Addendum

B at \ 16.

From Mr. Hurd: That sounds good to me, but I'm not

dead yet."

Id^. This finding by the trial court is speculative

because

finding

its

notes

something like this[.]"

that
IdL

»(t]he

conversation

probably

00004646.97
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In

Nielson, 558 P.2d at 513.
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The record is devoid of any clear and convincing evidence,
Nielson, 558 P.2d at 513, which would demonstrate the existence
of a confidential relationship between Mr. Hurd and Mr. Sherman.
The record also fails to demonstrate, by the same burden of
proof, the existence of an oral promise to hold property given by
either defendant to Mr. Hurd or by either defendant to Grayce.
Because the record does not establish that "certain
circumstances" existed, by clear and convincing proof, the trial
court erred when it imposed a constructive trust on the conveyed
real property, the transfer of funds as gifts, and the transfer
of personal property.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THERE WAS NO
CONSIDERATION FOR THE QUITCLAIM DEED, THE CHECK OR THE
VEHICLE TITLES
The trial court found that neither Mr. Sherman nor Ms.

Sherman paid money or transferred anything of value to Grayce in
exchange for the quitclaim deed, the checks and the vehicle
titles.

See Addendum B at f 25.

The defendants assert that the

trial court erred in its finding.
With respect to the quitclaim deed,

fl

[a]s between the

parties a deed is good, with or without consideration."

See

Barlow Soc. v. Commercial Security Bank, 723 P.2d 398, 401 (Utah
1986) (citing Brown v. Peterson Development Co., 622 P.2d 1175
(Utah 1980)).
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Regarding the trial court's finding of no consideration for
the transfer of the funds, those transfer were gifts. R-413

The

evidence establishes this because Mr. Hurd discussed this topic
with Mr. Eddington.

Id. at 360. The testimony of Kenneth Lamb,

Deon Lamb and Lorna Guenther specifically set forth that Mr.
Sherman was to receive the truck, trailer and house.

R-225, 229,

230, 231, 373, 381-382. Mr. Hurd's conversation with Mr.
Eddington was to transfer his property to Mr. Sherman and how to
make a gift of property he owned to Mr. and Ms. Sherman and what
the problems would be if he made the transfers. R-360. Mr.
Eddington informed Mr. Hurd of the gift tax problems and other
ramifications of transferring his property to Mr. Sherman.
Grayce also testified that Mr. Hurd wanted his bank account
monies transferred to the defendants as gifts and as gifts no
consideration is necessary. R-4 00.

(Note: Grayce's name was not

on the bank accounts and she did not sign any documents for their
transfer to defendants.)
With respect to the consideration for the transfer of
vehicle titles, the consideration was to see that Grayce was
taken care of.

Id. at 365. This has in fact occurred.

Defendants have allowed Grayce to remain living in the home and
even have made some repairs to the home. R-412, 416. Mr. Hurd
did not trust Paul Sherman or Iris Meir and believed that they
00004646.97

23

would wrongfully "steal" the property from Grayce. Nor did Mr,
Hurd believe Grayce should have the property. R-22 6, 227, 231,
360, 365.

This testimony is objective testimony because it came

from objective witnesses, Mr. Eddington, Kenneth Lamb, Deon Lamb
and Lorna Guenther.

Id.

The plaintiff also testified that there

was consideration for the transfers.

During examination by

plaintiffs' counsel, plaintiff testified to the following: "Lloyd
also talked to Lewellyn about it, and he said, I want to know
that Grayce will be taken care of?" Thus, the trial court erred
when it found there was no consideration for the transfer of real
property, checks and vehicle titles.
Further, the plaintiffs failed to allege in their complaint
any constructive trust and never moved to modify their complaint
to assert a claim of constructive trust.

The defendants at the

close of plaintiffs7 case moved to dismiss the action in part on
the failure to plead, allege or move the court to request a
constructive trust. R-347. This was again raised in closing
argument. R-434.

The plaintiffs' claim of fraud was an "all or

nothing" type of claim.
property.

Grayce didn't want a life estate in the

She wanted all of the property or nothing.

why she alleged fraud as the basis of her complaint.

00004646.97
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This is

D.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT ALL THE
PROPERTY SHOULD BE IMMEDIATELY RETURNED
The trial court concluded that the following should be

returned to Grayce immediately:
a.

A house and lot located in Kanab, Kane County, State of

Utah, or particularly described as:
Beginning at a point 6.0 rods East of the Southwest
corner of Lot 2, Block 26, Plat "A" of the official
survey of Kanab Townsite, and running thence East 6.0
rods, then north 108.75°; thence West 6.0 rods; thence
South 108.75° to the point of beginning.
b.

Two shares of stock in the Kanab irrigation Company;

c.

A travel trailer, 5th-wheel type, Teton brand, 1978

model;
d.

A travel trailer, 18 feet long, Kit Companion brand;

e.

A 1977 Chevrolet pickup truck;

f.

A 1980 Oldsmobile automobile;

g.

$2 0,000.00 taken by defendants from Zions First

National Bank, account no: 052-50552-6.

Id. at f 2.

The trial court incorrectly concluded that the foregoing
should be returned immediately to Grayce for two distinct
reasons.

First, the facts in this case would at best state that

it was Mr. Hurd's intention to create a life estate with respect
to the home for the benefit of Grayce with the remainder of the
property to be owned and held by the defendants.

Second, Grayce

could not immediately take possession because any reconveyance
00004646.97
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places Grayce and Mr. Sherman in their respective positions,
which is as tenants in common.
1.

The Creation of a Life Estate
Mr. Eddington testified that part of the consideration for

executing the Power of Attorney in favor of Mr. Sherman was
because Mr. Hurd wanted to see that Grayce was taken care of.
Id. at 365.
Plaintiff testified as follows:
* * *

Q.

Are you sure it was a quit-claim deed?

A.

To give Lewellyn the power of attorney.

Q.

I See. Now, after that telephone call, was there some
discussions before the attorney came that you recall?

A.

We just talked about the same thing and everybody
agreed on it. And Lloyd asked me if I would go along
with it, and I said, "Lloyd, if that's what you want,
why, we would trust him with that."

Q.

Now, did you talk to Lewellyn about what was to be done
with the property?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And who said what to Lewellyn or Connie?

A.

Lloyd also talked to Lewellyn about it, and he said, I
want to know that Grayce will be taken care of.

Q.

And did Lewellyn or Connie respond when he said that?

A.

Lewellyn did.

He said, I'll see she's taken care of.
* * *
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R-291 (emphasis provided).
The foregoing testimony, the defendants assert, demonstrate
at best that it was Mr. Hurd's intention to create a life estate
in the real property for the benefit of Grayce.

Therefore, the

property would not be returned to Grayce but she would be allowed
to live at the home during her lifetime.
2.

The Severance of the Joint Tenancy
"When a joint tenant makes 'a bona fide conveyance of his

interest in property to a third party, . . . this has the effect
of terminating the joint tenancy, and converting the ownership
into a tenancy in common."

Crowther v. Mower. 876 P.2d 876, 878

(Utah App. 1994) (quoting Nelson v. Davis, 592 P.2d 594, 596
(Utah 1979)) (other citations omitted) (ellipsis in original).
Grayce and Mr. Sherman signed a quitclaim deed regarding the
real property, which said deed was recorded on June 2, 1992. See
Addendum B f 22, also plaintiffs' Exhibit no. 21. Mr. Sherman
signed the quitclaim deed as the attorney-in-fact.

Id.

Grayce

signed the quitclaim after she and Mr. Hurd discussed signing the
quitclaim deed, and then mutually agreed she sign.

R-318. The

grantors were Mr. Hurd and Grayce Hurd, husband and wife, and the
grantees were Mr. Sherman and Ms. Sherman, as joint tenants with
full rights of survivorship, and not as tenants in common.
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Id.

When Mr. Sherman signed the quitclaim deed, as Mr. Hurd,
which was Mr. Hurd's instruction to Mr. Sherman, (R-415), that
had the effect of conveying Mr. Hurd's interest in the real
property to Mr. Sherman, and the joint tenancy was severed.
Whether or not Grayce consented to it is immaterial.

"'[E]ither

party to a joint tenancy may terminate it . . . and . . . the
consent of the other tenants to the severance or termination is
not required."

Id. (quoting 48A C.J.S. Joint Tenancy § 16 at 343

(1981) (citing Nelson, 592 P.2d at 596-97 and Clearfield State
Bank v. Contos, 562 P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1977)).

The real

property did not need to be returned because the joint tenancy
has been severed.

Also, because Grayce conveyed her interest to

Mr. Sherman, Mr. Sherman owns the whole of the property.
E.

THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH PLAINTIFFS'
CLAIMS
Plaintiffs' Complaint (R-9-5) does not specifically set

forth causes of actions against the defendants.

A reading of the

Complaint, however, shows the plaintiffs alleged a cause of
action based on fraud.
1.

Evidence Supporting Plaintiffs' Claim of Confidential
Advisors
With respect to the plaintiffs' claim regarding

"confidential advisors," that claim may relate to the imposition
of a constructive trust because a finding of a confidential
00004646.97
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relationship is a prerequisite to the imposition of a
constructive trust.

See Ashton, 733 P.2d at 151 ("The transferee

at the time of the transfer was in a confidential relationship to
the transferor") (quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 45(b)
(1957)).

This issue has already been discussed by the defendants

in subsection B.

The plaintiffs did not prove the existence of a

confidential relationship (confidential advisors) by clear and
convincing evidence.

Because the plaintiffs failed to prove the

existence of a confidential relationship, a requisite to a
constructive trust, the evidence does not support plaintiffs'
claim of constructive trust.
2.

Evidence Supporting Plaintiffs' Claim of Fraud
Under Utah law, to bring a claim sounding in
fraud, a party must allege (1) that a representation
was made (2) concerning a presently existing material
fact (3) which was false and (4) which the
representator either (a) knew to be false or (b) made
recklessly, knowing there was insufficient knowledge
upon which to base such representation, (5) for the
purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it and
(6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in
ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon it
(8) and was thereby induced to act (9) to that party's
injury and damage.

Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1066-67
(Utah 1996) (citations omitted).

"A misrepresentation of

intended future performance is not a 'presently existing fact'
upon which a claim of fraud can be based unless a plaintiff can
prove that the representator, at the time of the representation,
00004646.97
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did not intend to perform and made the representation for the
purpose of deceiving the promisee." Andalex Resources, Inc. v.
Mvers, 891 P. 2d 1041, 1046 (Utah App. 1994) (citing Applied
Genetics, Int's, Inc. v. First Affiliated Securities, Inc., 912
F.2d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir. 1990)).

"Fraud claims must be proven

by clear and convincing evidence."

Id.

Defendants assert that plaintiffs' cause of action sounding
in fraud must also fail because the plaintiff did not plead the
enumerated factors set forth in Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil
Co., 915 P.2d at 1066-67, then prove those factors by clear and
convincing evidence, Andalex Resources, Inc., 891 P.2d at 1046.
Not only did the plaintiffs not plead and prove the essential
elements of fraud, the trial court did not find fraud.
Addendum B.

See

The reason for this is because the evidence does not

support a claim sounding in fraud.

The plaintiffs did, however,

alleged certain terms which could be attributable to a claim
sounding in fraud.

Because the plaintiffs did use certain terms,

as to a claim sounding in fraud, the defendants will analyze
those certain representations which the plaintiffs alleged were
"false and fraudulent."
a.

PL's Compl. at ffl 10, 11. R-9-5.

a representation was made

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants represented that
"the transfers must be made . . . in order to avoid probate and
00004646.97
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inheritance problems which would result because of the impending
death of Lloyd H. Hurd[.]"

Pl-'s Compl. J 10. The plaintiffs

also allege that the defendants represented "that there was an
additional need to avoid creditors which made it urgent that all
of the plaintiffs' property be transferred to defendants where it
would be held in safekeeping for their benefit."

Id. at f 11.

With respect to representation concerning transfers to avoid
probate and inheritance problems, plaintiffs' own testimony
refutes this allegation.

On direct examination, plaintiff

testified as follows:
* * *

Q.

Okay. And then what was said and who said it, do you
remember?

A.

In the discussion?

Q.

Yes.

A.

That we had to get something done with the property
and—

Q.

Who said that?

A.

And all our things that was, everything, the vehicles
and everything was in both of our names had to be
transferred out of our names because if we put Lloyd in
the rest home, they would—the State would take
everything.
*
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*

R-288 (emphasis provided).

(Note: defendants objected to this

response on grounds of 'not being responsive' which was sustained
by the court.)
Additional testimony from the plaintiff consisted of the
following:
* * *

Q.

Now did you discuss the need for transferring the
property on the trip down?

A.

Oh, I think there was something said, yes.

Q.

Do you recall what was said?

A.

Well, that we have to get down to Kanab and get that
taken care of.

Q.

Was there any other statements about why you had to
take care of it?

A.

Yes. I was afraid I was going to lose my Social
Security if it wasn't taken care of.

Q.

And who told you that?

A.

Lewellyn and Connie.
* * *

R-294 (emphasis provided).
There was no testimony from the plaintiffs regarding an
alleged representation that "the transfers must be made . . . in
order to avoid probate and inheritance problems." Therefore,
even if the plaintiffs allege that "the transfers must be made .
. . in order to avoid probate and inheritance problems," the
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plaintiffs failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
that this representation was made.

Because the plaintiffs failed

to prove the existence of an alleged representation that "the
transfers must be made . . . in order to avoid probate and
inheritance problems," it is unnecessary to discuss the other
factors and, accordingly, plaintiffs' claim of fraud based upon
this alleged representation must fail.

,
I

The plaintiffs also allege that the defendants represented
"that there was an additional need to avoid creditors which made
it urgent that all of the plaintiffs' property be transferred to
defendants where it would be held in safekeeping for their
benefit."

PL's Compl. 5 11. The foregoing testimony from the

plaintiffs also show that, although the plaintiffs allege there
was a representation there was a need to transfer to avoid
creditors, the plaintiffs, again, fail to prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that this representation was made.

Because

the plaintiffs fail to prove this alleged representation, it is
unnecessary to discuss the other factors and, hence, plaintiffs7
claim of fraud based upon this alleged representation must fail.
In sum, because the plaintiffs failed to prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, the existence of a confidential
relationship, that claim must fail.

Similarly, because the

plaintiffs fail to plead the essential elements of a claim
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sounding in fraud, then prove these elements by clear and
convincing evidence, plaintiffs7 claim of fraud must also fail.
Thus, the evidence was insufficient to prove plaintiffs' claims.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Because Grayce is not a real party in interest based upon
her claim of surviving spouse of Mr. Hurd, she cannot bring and
maintain a cause of action against the defendants in the capacity
of Personal Representative of the Estate of Lloyd H. Hurd.

In

fact, no person can bring and maintain a cause of action against
the defendants in behalf of the Estate because no person
satisfies the enumerated factors.
Additionally, because the trial court did not find, by clear
and convincing proof, the existence of either a confidential
relationship and an oral promise to hold property, the trial
court erred when it imposed a constructive trust on the conveyed
real property, the transfer of funds, and the transfer of
personal property.
The trial court also erred when it found there was no
consideration for the transfer of the real property, checks and
vehicle titles.

This is because, as previously demonstrated,

either no consideration was necessary or there was sufficient
consideration.

00004646.97

34

The trial court also erred when it concluded that all of the
property be immediately returned to the plaintiffs because
Grayce's claim at best would have been to create a life estate in
one-half of the real property because she voluntarily transferred
her own interest to Mr. Sherman, and because the transfer of the
properties severed the joint tenancy.
Finally, the evidence does not support plaintiffs' claims of
constructive trust and fraud.

With respect to plaintiffs'

constructive trust claim, no confidential relationship existed
and, moreover, the evidence would not support such a finding.
Without this finding, plaintiffs' claim must fail.

Regarding

plaintiffs' claim of fraud, plaintiffs did not, by clear and
convincing evidence, prove the essential elements of fraud and,
therefore, this claim must also fail.

Therefore, there was

insufficient evidence to support plaintiffs' claims. A
constructive trust was never requested by plaintiffs and fraud
was never established.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day^qf June, 1997.
A

Attorney for Defendants
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLANTS, by
placing the same in the United States Mail, in a postage pre-paid
sealed envelope, this

^ ^

day of June, 1997 to the following:

Tex R. Olsen
OLSEN & CHAMBERLAIN
225 North 100 East
P.O. Box 100
Richfield, UT 84701
Attorney for Appellees
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ADDENDUM A

TEX R. OLSEN
No. 2467
OLSEN & CHAMBERLAIN

r

'^

225 NORTH 100 EAST, P.O. BOX 100
RICHFIELD, UTAH
84701
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
TELEPHONE: 896-4461

n

i
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * * * * * *

GRAYCE HURD
Plaintiff,
AMENDED
DECREE, JUDGMENT AND
ORDER

-vsLLEWELLYN J. SHERMAN and CONNIE
SHERMAN,
Defendants.

Civil No. 940600001
Judge: David L. Mower

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before
the Honorable David L. Mower, District Judge, city of Kanab, Utah
on 4th day of April, 1996.

Plaintiff appeared in person with her

counsel, Tex R. Olsen of Richfield, Utah and the Defendants
appeared in person their counsel Randy S. Ludlow, 311 South State
#280 Salt Lake City, Utah and the court having heard various
witnesses testifying or the parties and having examined evidence
received and the court having made its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law does now Decree an Order:
1.

The constructive trust created by the parties is hereby

terminated and the items transferred to the Defendants or either of
them as constructive trustees shall be delivered to Plaintiff
within a period of 10 days from the date of this Order.

In

addition to delivery of the items said forth, in this order,

Defendants shall execute such assignments and conveyances as are
necessary to transfer title thereof to Plaintiff, Grayce Hurd:
a.

Defendant's shall deed and convey unincumbered title

to the home located in Kanab, Kane County, Utah and particularly
described as follows:
Beginning at a point 6.0 rods East of the Southwest
corner of Lot 2, Block 26, Plat "A" of the official
survey of Kanab Townsite, and running thence East 6.0
rods; thence North 108.75'; thence West 6.0 rods; thence
South 108.75' to the point of beginning.
Together with 2 shares of stock in the Kanab Irrigation Company.
b.
ui ID t

model

0I w -

<* 2y
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travel trailer, 5th-wheel type, Teton Brand, 1978

T

c.

A house trailer, 18 foot ling, Kit companion brand;

d.

1977 Chevrolet pickup truck

e.

1980 Oldsmobile Automobile If the Oldsmobile is in
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the possession of Plaintiff the Defendants shall execute
such assignments as are necessary to clear title of the
property in Plaintiff.
2.

Further

Plaintiff,

is

granted

judgment

against

Defendants, and each of them in the sum of $2 0,0 00 and costs.
DATED this

eh t day of September ,/£996 .,

c_

)ISTRICT JUDGE

t\
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ADDENDUM B

TEX R. OLSEN
No. 2467
OLSEN & CHAMBERLAIN
225 NORTH 100 EAST, P.O. BOX 100
RICHFIELD, UTAH
84701
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
TELEPHONE: 896-4461
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * * * * * *

GRAYCE HURD
Plaintiff,
AMENDED
FINDINGS
OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW

-vsSt

x

a .!»
u OQ a- x

LLEWELLYN J. SHERMAN and CONNIE
SHERMAN,
Defendants.

Civil No. 940600001

as--a
0i W -

Judge:

David L. Mower
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UJ a: U
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before
the Honorable David L. Mower, District Judge, city of Kanab, Utah
on April 4, 1996. Plaintiff was present with her attorney, Tex R.
Olsen of Richfield, Utah and the Defendants were present with their
attorney Randy S. Ludlow, 311 South State #280, Salt Lake City,
Utah and the court having heard the witnesses who testified and
having examined the various items of evidence entered and being
fully advised and having considered objections of Defendant does
now make the following Findings of Fact:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The parties to this action are individuals. Their names

L^
\

are Grayce Hurd, Llewellyn J. Sherman and Connie Sherman.

Grayce

was born on July 26, 1914. She lives at 123 East 100 North, Kanab,
Utah.

Llewellyn lives in West Valley City, Utah.
2.

Grayce Hurd is the mother of four living children, 2

boys, Paul and Llewellyn, and 2 girls, Iris and Dorothy.

All are

adults. Their father was Rupert Sherman. The son Llewellyn is the
same person as Defendant Llewellyn J. Sherman.
3.

Defendants Llewellyn and Connie were married together,

but are now divorced.
4.

Grayce

Hurd

is currently

acting

as

the

personal

LI 00 "• T

representative of the
Ollil

Estate of Lloyd I. Hurd, deceased.

The

.

estate is being probated in this Court.
U
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5.

Lloyd died on June 3, 1992.

He was a veteran of the

U.S. Military Forces.
6.
entered

Lloyd and Grayce lived together since 1964, but never

into

formal marriage

contract.

They never

had any

children.
7.

Lloyd

and Grayce

did

the

following

while

living

together:
a. Lived in several different cities and acquired both
real and personal property over the years;
b.

Filed tax returns with the IRS and the State of

Utah for the calendar year 1986; the filing status on
y

the returns show "married, filing jointly;"
\

c.

On June 10, 1985, they received a warranty deed

from Georgia Phelps in which the grantees are "Lloyd I.
Hurd and Grayce Hurd, his wife,...;"
d.

On July 10, 1985 they purchased title insurance in

the names of "Lloyd I. Hurd and Grayce Hurd, his
wife...;"
e.

In

June and July of 1986 they maintained a joint

checking account with Zions First National Bank, Kanab
Office.
f.

From 1984 to 1986 they maintained a joint checking

account with Valley Bank and Trust, Granger-Hunter
Office. The account was in the names of Mr. Lloyd Hurd
or Mrs. Lloyd Hurd..
8.

In 1992 Lloyd became ill with cancer.

9.

On June 1, 1992, Lloyd and Grayce owned the following

items of property:
a.

A house and lot located in Kanab, Kane County,

State of Utah, more particularly described as:
Beginning at a point 6.0 rods East of the Southwest
corner of Lot 2, Block 26, Plat "A" of the official
survey of Kanab Townsite, and running thence East
6.0 rods, thence north 108.75'; thence West 6.0
rods; thence South 108.75' to the point of
beginning.
b.

Two shares of stock in the Kanab

Company.

Irrigation

c.

a travel trailer, fifth-heel type, Teton brand,

1978 model;
d.

A travel trailer, 18 feet long, Kit Companion

brand;
e.

a 1977 Chevrolet pickup truck;

f.

A 1980 Oldsmobile automobile;

g.

A bank account a Zions First National Bank, Kanab

Branch, account number 052-50552-6, worth $20,420.85;
h. A bank account at Zions First National Bank, Kanab

< x0 j mo

Branch, account number 052-33638-5, worth $789.65.

tr .$

10.

t<SD

On May

4,

1992, Grayce

took

Lloyd

to Veterans

Administration Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah for treatment. He
Zfi

LU c U
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had cancer and was dying.

Grayce stayed at Llewellyn's for a

couple of days and then returned to kanab.
11.

kenneth Lamb of West Jordan, Utah, who is Lloyd's

cousin, visited him in the hospital, Lloyd said, "Llewellyn is the
only one I trust."
12.

On May 14, 1992, Lloyd left the V.A. Hospital and went

to Llewellyn's home. Grayce had come from Kanab and was there with
them.
13.

Kenneth Lamb and his wife, Deon, visited.

conversation about Lloyd's need for care.
name of a rest home.

there was a

Kenneth mentioned the

Connie called a relative who worked at

A*

another rest home.

Part of the conversation had to do with

protecting Lloyd and Grayce's property from being dissipated to pay
or long-term care.
14.

On about May 15, 1992 iris, Llewellyn and another

family member went to the office of Mr. Keith E. Eddington, an
attorney.

The topics of gift taxes and transfer of documents were

discussed.
15.

On about May 20, 1992 Connie went to a document

o

supplier or perhaps, an office supply store, and purchased a filli n W 0 oo
ui OQ 1- T

a s h-j<
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in- the -blank power of attorney form and took it to Mr. Eddington
who filled in the blanks.
16.

J

T
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On Friday, May 29, 1992 Lloyd, Grayce, Llewellyn and

lL

Connie met in Llewellyn's home and had a conversation.

The

conversation probably went something like this:
Grayce: Lloyd, you're very ill. We should have you live
someplace where you can get proper care, like a care center
or a rest home.
Lloyd: The only rest home where I would ever go is the same
one where my sister Ruth is.
Connie: (makes a phone call to the rest home where Ruth is
and then reports:) There is no room there, and besides
there is a waiting list to get in. My uncle works at the
care center in Richfield, Utah. I'll call him and find out
about their program.
Lloyd: Who will pay for all this. Will Medicare pay? Will
I lose my home to help pay for all these expenses?
Connie: I just spoke with my uncle, Rodney Rasmussen, he
says that Medicare will pay for rest home expenses, but they

will want you to use up all our money and property first
before they will pay anything. He also said something about
setting aside transfers to defraud creditors.
I didn't
understand it all, but something about being able to cancel
transactions that had taken place for up to 18 months before
admission to the rest home.
Lloyd:
I don't want any of my property to go to the
government. I want Grayce to have it. I'm just afraid that
if she has it, Paul and Iris will try to take it from her
and that she will allow them to do it. Llewellyn, why don't
I give it all to you, then you can make sure that Grayce
will be taken care of. Grace, is that ok with you?
Grayce:

It that's what you want, whatever you say.

Lloyd: Grace and I have been together for almost 3 0 years,
but we never did get married. Still, I think I should treat
her as my wife.
Grayce: What about social security, Lloyd. Will I be able
to collect under your name, even though we never got
married?
Connie:
That worries me.
What if Mom collects social
security under Dad's name and then the government discovers
they weren't married. They'll want her to pay it back. If
she's spent the money, then maybe the home would be in
danger.
Llewellyn: Let's do this: I'll keep all the property for a
year. Mom can apply for social security. If nobody says
anything for a year, then we should be safe and I'll give
all the property back to her. In the meantime, she can
continue living in the house.
Lloyd: That sounds good to me, but I'm not dead yet.
want to go back home.

I

Llewellyn; I know, I know. But, let's call that lawyer and
get the power of attorney signed. Then if anything should
happen to you then you and Mom will be protected.
17.

Mr. Eddingtom came, met with Lloyd, who signed the

power of attorney.

It was left with Llewellyn.

Grayce paid Mr.

Eddington

$50.00.

18.

Llewellyn made arrangements for Lloyd to stay with

Kenneth and Deon Lamb.
19.
30, 1992.
20.

Lloyd went to their home on May 29, 1992.

Llewellyn and Grayce left for Kanab on Saturday, May
Lloyd took a turn for the worse on Tuesday, June 2,

1992 while at the Lambs home.

Mr. Lamb called someone and then

took Lloyd back to the Veterans Administration hospital.
21.

o

On Tuesday, June 2, 1992, Llewellyn had blank checks
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for account 052-50552-6.

He filled out two as follows:

a
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Check #

Payee

Amount

101

Llewellyn Sherman

$10,000.00

Lloyd I. Hurd
Gift
Llewellyn Sherman

102

Connie Sherman

$10,000.00

Lloyd I. Hurd
Gift
Llewellyn Sherman

5*2s

Signature

For

Zfi
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Llewellyn presented these checks for payment along with a copy of
the power of attorney.

They were at the bank until noon when they

left without having negotiated the checks.
22.

They went to a title company.

quitclaim deed prepared.

Grayce paid to have a

Grayce and Llewellyn signed the deed and

offered it for recording at the County Recorder's office.

It was

recorded on June 2, 1992 at 2:55 p.m. at book 0120 page 777 of the
official records of Kane County.

Grayce paid the recording fee.

The grantors in the deed are "Lloyd I. Hurd and Grayce Hurd,
husband and wife."

The grantees in the deed are "Llewellyn J.

Sherman and Connie Sherman, husband and wife, as joint tenants with
full rights of survivorship, and not as tenants in common."
Llewellyn signed the deed for Lloyd as his attorney in fact.
23.

They went to the State Tax Commission office in Kanab

where Grayce signed the titles to the 1977 Chevrolet pickup, the
5th wheel and the 18-foot travel trailers.
transferred.

Grayce paid all the transfer fees.

24. They returned to the bank. Llewellyn opened an account

o

z2

there in the name of him and Connie.
LI OQ &.

The titles were

T
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A bank officer agreed to

negotiate the checks and deposit them into this new account.
25. Neither Llewellyn nor Connie paid money nor transferred
anything of value to Grayce in exchange or the quitclaim deed, the

U cU
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checks or the vehicle titles.
26.

Lloyd died on June 3, 1992

27.

On June 5, 1992 the Salt Lake City - County Health

01

Department

issued

a

Certificate

of

Death

for

Lloyd.

The

information listed therein is "Wife - Grayce N. Hurd \ 123 East 100
North Street #61 \ Kanab, Utah
28.

84741."

Lloyd's funeral was held on June 8, 1992 in Kanab.

After the services, Llewellyn and Grayce had a conversation.

He

said, "Let's wait a year and see what happens with Social Security.
Then I'll give all the property back to you."
29.

Llewellyn paid Lloyd's funeral and burial expenses and

has purchases headstones or both Lloyd and Grace.

There was no

evidence given at trial concerning values.
30.

In July of 1993, Llewellyn bought some materials and

helped install them on the roof of the home in Kanab. There was no
evidence given at trial concerning values.
31.

In the spring of 1993, Llewellyn transferred the title

to the 1978 Teton 5th-wheel to Grayce. She has possession of it in
Kanab.
32.

Connie testified that she claims no interest in the

home and lot in Kanab.

She said that she and Llewellyn were

recently divorced in Salt Lake County and that the decree awards
all of her interest in that property to him.
33.

More than one year has passed since Lloyd's death.

34.

No claims have been made by Social Security, Veterans'

Administration nor any Medicare or long term care provider.
Based upon the

foregoing Findings of Fact the court now

enters the following Conclusions of Law:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. A constructive trust was created for the benefit of the
Plaintiff.
2. All of the property received in trust for the benefit of
the

Plaintiff

should

be

immediately

returned,

transferred to Plaintiff including the following:

assigned

and

a. A house and lot located in Kanab, Kane County, Utah
or particularly described as:
Beginning at a point 6.0 rods East of the Southwest
corner of Lot 2, Block 26, Plat "A" o the official
survey of Kanab Townsite, and running thence East
6.0 rods; thence North 108.75'; thence West 6.0
rods; thence south 108.75' to the point of
beginning.
b.

2 shares of stock in the Kanab Irrigation Company.

c. A house trailer, 5th-wheel type, Teton Brand, 1978
model
*~$
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d.

A travel trailer, 18 foot long, Kit Companion

brand;
e.

1977 Chevrolet pickup truck

f.

1980 Oldsmobile Automobile

g.

$20,000.00 taken by Defendants from Zions First
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National Bank, account number 052-50552-6;
3. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the Defendants
in the sum of $20,000.00 together with costs of court incurred.
DATED this

day of September, 1996.

DISTRICT JUDGE
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